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NO. 8 MARCH 2020 Introduction 
The EU Will Not Be Able to Enforce the 
UN Arms Embargo in Libya 
Markus Kaim and René Schulz 
On 19 January 2020 a high-level conference was held in Berlin to find solutions to the 
conflict in Libya between the unity government under Fayez al-Sarraj and the troops 
led by General Khalifa Haftar. A central agreement in the final declaration aims to 
stop the unimpeded influx of weapons that external actors are making available to the 
warring parties. The conference participants committed themselves to “unequivocally 
and fully respect and implement the arms embargo established by United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and the Council’s subsequent resolutions, 
including the proliferation of arms from Libya, and call on all international actors to 
do the same”. The declaration thus reaffirms the existing resolutions, revealing its 
basic problem: So far, the United Nations (UN) has not been able to effectively enforce 
the current embargo for a variety of reasons. 
 
Following the Berlin Conference, the EU 
has announced that, in the coming weeks, 
it will work out options as to how the deci-
sions made in Berlin can be implemented 
and what contribution Europe can make 
to this. Following discussions between Euro-
pean Union (EU) foreign ministers on 20 
January, EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner 
Josep Borrell said that one of the aims of 
the mission is to monitor compliance with 
the arms embargo from sea by means of 
the EU maritime mission “Sophia”, which 
has been operating on a limited scale since 
April 2019. This measure is to be embedded 
in a larger EU military mission to monitor 
the agreed ceasefire. The EU’s Political and 
Security Committee is now working out 
concrete steps. German politicians, too, 
have cautiously expressed their support for 
such an EU mission and declared that they 
are open to participation by the Bundeswehr. 
The Problem of Uncontrolled 
Arms Transfers 
The starting point of the considerations 
made at the Berlin Conference and by the 
EU, respectively, is a depressing analysis 
of the conflict in Libya. The country has 
finally become the venue for a proxy con-
flict since Turkey began supplying weapons 
to the government in Tripoli in May 2019. 
In this context, Libya also became a kind of 
testing ground for foreign military equip-
ment. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 
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Egypt have consistently provided massive 
levels of support for General Haftar since 
2014, whereas his opponents received no 
foreign support between 2016 and 2018. 
In violation of the UN arms embargo im-
posed on Libya and with considerable con-
sequences for the security of the country 
and the region, foreign actors have smuggled 
drones, armoured personnel carriers, and 
sophisticated missile systems into Libya in 
addition to small arms. 
In the course of the 2011 revolution, 
militias looted the Gaddafi regime’s stocks 
of light weapons. Since then, the prolifera-
tion of weapons has been a security prob-
lem for Libya and its neighbours. Between 
the end of 2011 and 2013 in particular, 
such weapons also reached the Sahel, the 
rest of North Africa, and the Levant. The 
spread of these weapons exacerbated in-
stability in countries such as Syria and Mali, 
which were also affected by conflict. With 
the outbreak of civil war in 2014, Libya 
became one of the major arms importers 
and has remained so ever since. 
The offensive launched by Haftar against 
Tripoli in the spring of 2019 led to a resur-
gence of civil war, and state arms deliveries 
to the warring parties intensified. Today, 
according to the UN, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, 
and Russia support General Haftar’s “Libyan 
Arab Armed Forces”. Turkey, for its part, 
provides military support to the UN- and 
EU-recognised government in Tripoli, as 
well as to the allied militias that have joined 
forces against Haftar. As a result of this inter-
nationalisation of the conflict, military 
equipment reaches Libya by air, land, and 
sea. 
The fact that armed non-state groups in 
Libya are trained on these weapons systems 
and use them has dangerous consequences 
not only for this country. As in Afghanistan 
in the 1990s and 2000s – or in the Sahel 
in the 2010s – fighters from other armed 
groups could come to Libya to receive the 
appropriate training. However, a possible 
development emanating from Libya also 
presents a threat: Between 2012 and 2014, 
terrorists and separatist groups filled their 
arsenals with Libyan weapons; now weap-
ons from Libya could, in turn, penetrate 
into neighbouring countries, a number of 
which are increasingly struggling with in-
surgencies fuelled by the so-called Islamic 
State (IS) and al-Qaida. 
It is now doubtful whether the optimism 
at the Berlin Conference that the embargo 
could really be enforced was justified. 
According to the UN, the arms embargo re-
affirmed at the Berlin Conference has since 
been broken by several summit partici-
pants. In the weeks that have passed since 
the conference, several planes have landed 
at airports in western and eastern Libya, 
bringing weapons, armoured vehicles, fight-
ers, and advisers into the country. In its 
statement of 25 January 2020, the UN Sup-
port Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) did not 
name any responsible parties and thus left 
it open as to who had broken the embargo. 
However, it noted that “several who partici-
pated in the Berlin Conference” had been 
involved in the “ongoing transfer of foreign 
fighters, weapons, ammunition and ad-
vanced systems” and other military equip-
ment. 
The Arms Embargo 
Already in February 2011, the UN Security 
Council decided “that all Member States 
shall immediately take the necessary meas-
ures to prevent the direct or indirect 
supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, from or through their terri-
tories or by their nationals, or using their 
flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related 
materiel of all types, including weapons 
and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment, and 
spare parts for the aforementioned, and 
technical assistance, training, financial or 
other assistance, related to military activ-
ities or the provision, maintenance or use 
of any arms and related materiel, including 
the provision of armed mercenary person-
nel whether or not originating in their ter-
ritories”. Further sanctions complement the 
arms embargo and are monitored by a com-
mittee of the UN Security Council estab-
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lished in the wake of Libya’s 1970 resolu-
tion (2011). In 2020, Germany holds the 
chair of this committee. 
In addition, the Security Council has 
authorised UN member states on several 
occasions, most recently in June 2019, to 
monitor compliance with the arms embargo, 
individually or through regional organisa-
tions. Vessels for which there are reason-
able grounds to believe they are carrying 
arms or related materiel to or from Libya 
are to be inspected off the coast of Libya. 
There are no comparable explicit authorisa-
tions for the control of land routes or air-
space. In March 2011, the Security Council 
also established a panel of experts to exam-
ine the extent to which the arms embargo 
imposed on Libya is being respected. In its 
extensive and very detailed final report of 
29 November 2019, the panel concludes 
that the embargo has remained largely 
ineffective. Both parties to the conflict had 
been supplied with weapons and military 
equipment and provided with technical 
support. Some of the main governments 
responsible are explicitly named: According 
to the experts’ assessment, Jordan, Turkey, 
and the UAE routinely supplied arms and 
did not even make any special effort to 
conceal such supplies. 
The monitoring and control of arms 
flows by the UN may not be complete, and 
certainly the provision of information by 
member states could be improved. Never-
theless, the UN has a fairly good overall 
view thanks to the expert panel reports. It 
is all the more surprising that in the days 
following the Berlin Conference, some Ger-
man and European politicians called for the 
EU to “monitor” the arms embargo against 
Libya. Instead, however, the priority would 
be to “enforce” the embargo. 
In principle, the embargo could be en-
forced in two ways: either by the Security 
Council imposing sanctions on actors who 
supply weapons to the warring Libyan 
parties, or by preventing such supplies by 
military means. 
Enforcement through Sanctions 
Although the UN experts have presented 
thoroughly investigated evidence of viola-
tions of the embargo, it is unlikely that 
the members of the UN Security Council 
will agree on appropriate sanctions. This is 
because external actors (including members 
of the Security Council, namely Russia and 
France) are pursuing different interests in 
Libya and have little confidence that sanc-
tions can be implemented impartially on an 
international level. But only under this con-
dition would they possibly be willing to co-
operate in the enforcement of the embargo. 
Those states that support warring parties do 
not currently expect others to adhere to the 
embargo. Accordingly, none of them wants 
to reduce the chances of victory for their 
allies. 
Sanctions directed against individuals or 
companies would also have to be decided 
by the UN Security Council, whose mem-
bers are also pursuing divergent interests. 
In the case of Libya, too, its permanent 
members are likely to use their right of 
veto. For example, one of the most obvious 
addressees of sanctions would be the UAE. 
However, given the proximity of the UAE to 
the United States, for example, which has 
armed forces stationed in the country, it 
seems unlikely that the Trump administra-
tion is prepared to jeopardise bilateral rela-
tions by imposing sanctions on the UAE. 
The EU would, of course, be free to 
decide on its own sanctions that go beyond 
the UN sanctions. On the one hand, how-
ever, its member states would have to de-
velop a cohesive Libya policy; on the other 
hand, it is questionable whether the EU has 
the impartiality and credibility necessary 
for this. In June 2019, for example, US anti-
tank missiles from French stocks were found 
on a base commanded by General Haftar. 
Paris denied supplying Haftar with the 
missiles at the time. France had therefore 
not violated the current arms embargo. The 
missiles had only served for the self-protec-
tion of a French contingent that had carried 
out a reconnaissance mission in Libya in 
the fight against terrorism. 
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Enforcement by Coercive 
Military Measures 
In the European debate, there are some 
voices in favour of enforcing the arms em-
bargo through coercive military measures. 
This could be achieved either through a 
maritime component alone, so the expec-
tation is, or additionally by controlling land 
routes and Libyan airspace. From a military 
perspective, the following measures would 
have to be taken. 
Sea routes: Libya’s coastline is more than 
1,700 km long. In order to be able to moni-
tor the coastal waters off the land, at least 
two frigates would have to be permanently 
in service in these waters. Since scheduled 
port calls have to be taken into account, in 
practice this would mean the deployment 
of three to four frigates. For searching sus-
picious ships, so-called boarding teams 
would be necessary, which would be trans-
ferred to the ships either by helicopter or 
with the help of speedboats. 
The current European discussion on the 
revival of the EUNAVFOR MED operation 
“Sophia” highlights another problem. The 
monitoring and enforcement of the arms 
embargo has been part of the mandate of 
“Sophia“ since 2016, along with the fight 
against smuggling. This order was also 
carried out by the Bundeswehr in 2017. On 
1 May 2017, the Bundeswehr, with Lithua-
nian support, searched a ship for the first 
time – the motor vessel El Mukthar, flying 
the Libyan flag – and confiscated various 
weapons in the process. 
In practice, however, it will hardly be 
possible to separate the mandate to enforce 
an arms embargo from the rescue of refugees 
at sea. The revival of the operation with the 
aim of enforcing the arms embargo would 
be, from a European perspective, a return 
to the situation before June 2019, when 
“Sophia” was suspended because the ques-
tion about the distribution of distressed refu-
gees rescued at sea had not been resolved. 
Airspace: Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the EU does not have 
its own means of airspace surveillance. 
Therefore, only individual EU member 
states could support a NATO operation with 
their own capabilities, for example with air-
to-air refuelling aircraft. Airspace surveil-
lance would have to be handled by AWACS 
aircraft of the alliance. It would still have 
to be clarified how secure the airspace over 
Libya is. As an accompanying measure, a 
no-fly zone would therefore have to be 
established. To ensure safety in the Libyan 
airspace and enforce the no-fly zone, fighter 
planes and ships would have to be deployed. 
Unlike the international military mission in 
Libya in 2011, there is currently no discern-
ible political will to take such a measure, 
let alone a coalition of the willing to imple-
ment it. The effort involved in operation 
“Unified Protector” in 2011 was enormous: 
In the first two months of the operation 
alone, the contingents of the 16 partici-
pating states had flown more than 4,500 
sorties – including more than 1,800 strike 
sorties – and stopped 740 ships to enforce 
the arms embargo and no-fly zone. Apart 
from that, such a mission would currently 
bring the participating EU members into 
confrontation with NATO partner Turkey. 
Land routes: In principle, the arms em-
bargo cannot be effectively enforced with-
out land forces – this is also the greatest 
obstacle to such a mission. At least a five-
figure number of soldiers would be re-
quired to monitor a national border that is 
more than 4,300 km long and shared with 
six states. Apart from the fact that these 
soldiers would have to protect themselves 
in a country engaged in civil war, their task 
of securing the national borders would be 
made more difficult by the fact that some 
neighbouring countries are among the arms 
suppliers. Even if the EU were to provide 
only a portion of the troops for an inter-
national mission, such a number of soldiers 
is politically inconceivable at present, as is 
the necessary use of scarce resources such 
as helicopters and drones. Last but not 
least, the host country would have to give 
its consent, and this might be expected 
from the internationally recognised official 
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government of Libya, but probably not 
from General Haftar, who controls a large 
part of Libya with his troops. This would 
not be necessary under international law, 
but politically it would probably be un-
avoidable. In order to enforce the arms 
embargo at the country’s border or at air-
ports in Libya, an extended and more 
robust UN mandate is also needed, which 
Russia and the United States will certainly 
not allow as permanent members of the 
UN Security Council due to their respective 
specific interests and allies. 
Apart from military requirements, the 
question arises of how to deal with viola-
tions of a militarily enforced arms embargo. 
Destroying found weapons is still the 
easiest to achieve, but the mandate should 
clearly define and coordinate responsibili-
ties at the European level. It would also 
be important to put the transporters of 
delivered weapons on a black list, as was 
done in 2018 in the case of North Korea, for 
example. Dealing with the arms smugglers 
themselves is problematic, as they cannot 
be charged before an international court 
because international law only applies 
to states and international organisations, 
not to natural persons. Furthermore, the 
will to act internationally is only partially 
apparent. In any case, it seems more than 
questionable whether EU governments will 
authorise their armed forces to forcibly 
stop, for example, arms supplies from Rus-
sian or Turkish companies that have been 
at least encouraged, if not mandated, by 
the governments in Moscow and Ankara. 
This would potentially lead to far-reaching 
political disputes with actors and allies on 
whose cooperation the EU is dependent in 
other policy areas. 
Conclusions 
There are no easy, low-cost, and fully prom-
ising options for the EU to enforce the cur-
rent arms embargo in Libya. All options en-
tail political, financial, and military costs, 
some of them considerable. 
Option 1: Full Enforcement of the 
Arms Embargo 
It is true that the military conditions that 
must be fulfilled for the effective military 
enforcement of the arms embargo could 
theoretically easily be identified. However, 
no EU member state has indicated that it is 
prepared to participate in such a large-scale 
military operation. Political considerations 
play just as much of a role here as the 
reluctance to engage in a military operation 
that would involve considerable risks. In 
particular, efforts to effectively stop deliv-
eries by land and air would require signifi-
cant resources in an unpacified environ-
ment. At the same time, experience with 
comparable international missions teaches 
us that troops must remain in Libya – 
probably for several years, if not decades – 
until the conflict has been permanently 
settled politically. It is therefore not sur-
prising that the maritime component, in 
particular, is at the centre of European 
debates on the enforcement of the embargo. 
Option 2: 
“Maritime Arms Embargo” 
In view of the military effort required, 
the most likely option appears to be to con-
tinue monitoring arms smuggling in the 
Mediterranean Sea with naval units and air 
reconnaissance. This would send a political 
signal of commitment while keeping mili-
tary risks low. However, the effective en-
forcement of the embargo would be a long 
way off. 
Even if the details are a little different, a 
parallel emerges: the UNIFIL II operation off 
the coast of Lebanon, which has been on-
going since 2006. Since the end of the Leba-
non War in 2006 – the fighting between 
Hezbollah and Israel – this maritime UN 
mission with German participation has 
been supporting the Lebanese armed forces 
with coastal protection. The mission, which 
has a robust mandate, is designed to stop 
arms smuggling off the coast of Lebanon 
and to control the sea routes. In concrete 
terms, the aim is to prevent arms and other 
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military equipment from being brought 
into Lebanon without the consent of the 
Lebanese government. However, the control 
of land routes is so patchy that there is no 
real prospect of effectively stopping arms 
smuggling into Lebanon. 
Some EU members would certainly also 
object that a similar mission in Libyan 
waters would lead to an increase in the 
number of distressed migrants who need 
to be rescued, as in the earlier operation 
“Sophia”. This could be countered with 
European support for the NATO-led mari-
time security operation “Sea Guardian” in 
the Mediterranean, which includes among 
its tasks the fight against arms smuggling 
in the maritime environment. This approach 
would at the same time strengthen the 
European pillar in NATO and give the scep-
tics among the EU member states scope for 
participation. 
Another aspect is also important: An 
arms embargo monitored by sea would be 
one-sided in its consequences and be per-
ceived by Libyan conflict actors as political 
partisanship. This would make it more dif-
ficult for the government in Tripoli (which 
has no secure airports and no allied neigh-
bours) to obtain weapons from Turkey. The 
“Libyan Arab Forces,” on the other hand, 
would still have no problems receiving sup-
port by land or air. Such a maritime arms 
embargo would therefore be a measure that 
would give General Haftar a military advan-
tage. This would probably also be the inten-
tion of some EU member states such as France 
and Greece. However, it would be highly 
problematic in view of Germany’s priority 
to strengthen the government in Tripoli. 
Option 3: Use of Sanctions 
A first step on the way to a settlement of 
the Libyan conflict is the transformation 
of the commitments renewed in the Berlin 
process into a UN resolution. As part of its 
membership of the UN Security Council, 
Germany has called on the body to adopt a 
resolution endorsing the conclusions of the 
Berlin Conference. Resolution S/RES/2510 
(2020), adopted on 12 February 2020, under-
lines once again that all actors face conse-
quences if they continue to violate the arms 
embargo. Permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council, however, had called for a text 
that focussed more on the situation on the 
ground, with the United States pushing for 
the resolution to condemn Russian private 
military companies operating in Libya. Mos-
cow, in turn, refused to accept such a for-
mulation and abstained from voting. In 
addition, Russia had questioned whether 
the Council should even approve the Berlin 
outcome unless General Haftar confirmed 
his support for it. It remains uncertain 
whether international sanctions can actually 
be enforced on the basis of this resolution. 
As the EU is economically strong and the 
European Commission has decision-making 
powers in this area, punitive tariffs or re-
strictions on access to the European inter-
nal market for countries from which arms 
are exported to Libya could be envisaged. 
That foreign and security policy goals can, 
in principle, be effectively accomplished 
with the help of economic policy measures 
is shown by the current action of the Ameri-
can government in the dispute with Ger-
many, France, and the United Kingdom 
over a common Iran policy. Nevertheless, 
such measures are likely to mean an open 
confrontation with those EU member states 
involved in the Libyan conflict. 
A second option would be economic 
sanctions. The dependence of the Turkish 
economy, in particular, on the EU is ob-
vious and offers powerful leverage when 
dealing with President Recep Tayyip Erdo-
ğan. Economic sanctions would also have 
an indirect effect on the EU member states 
involved in the conflict. For a sanctions 
policy can only be implemented if the EU 
member states adhere strictly to the UN 
arms embargo. But even in this context, it 
must be taken into account that the leading 
EU member states are not willing to risk a 
conflict with Egypt and the UAE because of 
Libya. Thus, even if the EU members were 
to agree on sanctions against Turkey, the 
EU would still have no means of exerting 
pressure that could have an effect on the 
other central conflict actors. 
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Despite the difficulties involved in en-
forcing the arms embargo, the EU should 
also consider the consequences of its failure 
to act. Unlike individual EU member states, 
the EU is not a relevant actor in the Libyan 
conflict. If, however, it accepted that it had 
no realistic possibility of enforcing the arms 
embargo in view of the restrictions outlined 
above, the EU would be sending out a dis-
astrous signal in two respects. 
Firstly, the EU would be giving up its 
claim to act as an influencing power in its 
own neighbourhood. The structures and in-
struments it has developed for crisis manage-
ment have remained ineffective. The EU 
would continue to be affected by the con-
sequences of the Libyan conflict (further 
destabilisation of North Africa; migration 
movements; strengthening of terrorist 
groups) but unable to influence them. In 
addition, the political momentum of the 
Berlin Conference would fizzle out without 
having had any impact. 
Secondly, the EU would also be blatantly 
failing in view of the changing geopolitical 
realities that will shape the coming years. 
The United States, under President Donald 
Trump, has made it clear that the Libyan 
Civil War and its consequences do not enjoy 
foreign policy priority. Libya is thus a 
result, and at the same time a symbol, of 
the withdrawal of the United States from 
world politics. Other actors are currently 
filling the gap left by the United States, both 
politically and militarily. In this respect, 
Libya is also a warning sign for the global 
role of the EU and its willingness to shape 
world politics. 
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